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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation and 
Policy at the International Hellenic University. 
 
 Europe is facing increasing competition from rapidly growing economies around the world. 
As its domestic production declines and its dependency on non-EU gas imports increases, 
the EU has started seeking new sources of energy to diversify its energy mix. The current 
oversupply of LNG coupled with recent changes in the global LNG market which have 
moved the industry away from monopolistic structures towards competition and liquidity, 
made Europe to re-examine the opportunities LNG presents. The emergence of new LNG  
players trying to leverage the current market dynamics and optimize their portfolio, is 
creating demand for access to LNG import infrastructure. Under these circumstances, 
Europe has adopted certain strategies, so as to attract these new players to enter the 
European market. Within the framework of the liberalization of gas markets regulated TPA 
was implemented to LNG import terminals, which is an important policy tool to promote 
competition in the markets and facilitate the entrance of new suppliers. The EU wants to 
become a valuable outlet for LNG and it is in the position to achieve this, since the 
infrastructure is available, its regasification capacity is sufficient and its terminals are able 
to respond to prevailing global LNG market dynamics. However, the implementation of TPA 
to terminals comes along with challenges, such as infrastructural, operational and 
behavioural drawbacks that the EU has to overcome, in order to ultimately benefit from 
these new market trends.    
 
Keywords: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), regasification terminals, market liberalization, Third 
Party Access (TPA), secondary markets  
 
 
 
Eftychia Patanou 
16.02.2018 
 
 
  -i- 
Preface 
This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Eftychia 
Patanou. 
 
At this point, I would like to thank my thesis advisor Professor Dr Theodoros 
Panagos of the School of Economics, Business Administration & Legal Studies at 
International Hellenic University. He guided me with his useful and valuable 
comments and advices wherever he thought I needed. 
Finally, I take the opportunity to express my gratitude to my family and friends for 
their support and love during this challenging period.  
  
  -2- 
 
Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iii 
Preface .........................................................................................................................................i 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 4 
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF LIQUEFIED-NATURAL GAS (LNG) IN THE GLOBAL GAS TRADE ........... 6 
1.1. WHAT IS LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) ...................................................................... 6 
1.1.1. DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................ 6 
1.1.2. LNG VALUE CHAIN ................................................................................................... 7 
1.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LNG INDUSTRY ......................................................................... 8 
1.2.1. LNG vs PIPELINE GAS ............................................................................................... 9 
1.2.2. LNG EXPORTS-IMPORTS ........................................................................................ 10 
1.3. THE STRUCTURE OF LNG CONTRACTS AND THEIR PRICING SYSTEM ........................... 12 
1.3.1. ADVANTAGES OF LONG-TERM SPA ....................................................................... 12 
1.3.2. DISADVANTAGES OF LONG-TERM SPA .................................................................. 13 
1.3.3. EMERGENCE OF NEW TYPES OF CONTRACTS........................................................ 14 
1.3.4. LNG PRICING SYSTEM ............................................................................................ 17 
2. LIBERALIZATION OF EUROPEAN GAS MARKETS-THEORETICAL BACKGROUND .................. 18 
2.1. THE PRE-LIBERALIZATION PHASE-TOWARDS EU MARKET REFORM ............................ 18 
2.1.1. REASONS IMPEDING FOCUS ON ENERGY MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN THE EU ... 19 
2.1.2 STRUCTURE OF ENERGY MARKETS BEFORE LIBERALIZATION ................................ 20 
2.1.3. FIRST STEPS TOWARDS AN INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET ...................................... 21 
2.2. THE FIRST GAS DIRECTIVE ............................................................................................. 22 
2.2.1. INTRODUCTION OF TPA ......................................................................................... 23 
2.2.2. UNBUNDLING OF ACCOUNTS ................................................................................ 24 
2.2.3. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FIRST GAS DIRECTIVE .................................................... 25 
2.3. THE SECOND GAS DIRECTIVE ........................................................................................ 25 
2.3.1. INTRODUCTION OF EXEMPTION MECHANISMS .................................................... 26 
2.3.2. NOT A REAL CHANGE YET-NEED FOR FURTHER REFORMS ................................... 28 
2.4. THE THIRD GAS DIRECTIVE ........................................................................................... 29 
2.4.1. MAIN PROVISIONS ................................................................................................. 29 
2.4.2. FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS LIBERALIZATION ........................................................ 31 
2.4.3. CHALLENGES-NEW PACKAGE OF MEASURES ON THE WAY .................................. 32 
  -3- 
3. ANALYSIS OF THIRD PARTY ACCESS (TPA) RIGHT UNDER EU ENERGY LEGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................................... 32 
3.1. DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE OF TPA RIGHT ............................................................ 32 
3.1.1. INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION IN NETWORK-BOUND SECTORS..................... 33 
3.1.2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TPA AND UNBUNDLING ............................................... 34 
3.1.3. DEFINITION OF TPA ............................................................................................... 35 
3.1.4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE ................................................................. 35 
3.2. LNG ACCESS REGULATION IN THE EU ........................................................................... 36 
3.2.1. MAIN PROVISIONS AFFECTING LNG OPERATIONS ................................................ 38 
3.2.2. THE EU TPA EXEMPTION PROCEDURE................................................................... 39 
3.3. ACCESS-EXEMPTION REGIME: FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN COMPETITION 
AND INVESTEMENTS ........................................................................................................... 41 
3.3.1. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING TPA ............................................................................ 41 
3.3.2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST .......................................................................................... 42 
3.3.3. ISSUE OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES-COMPETITION TRADE OFF ........................... 43 
3.4. ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE AND GAS MARKETS ................................................. 45 
3.4.1. DEFINITION ............................................................................................................ 45 
3.4.2. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT ......................................................................... 45 
4. LNG IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ACCESS REGIME APPLIED TO LNG REGASIFICATION 
TERMINALS .............................................................................................................................. 46 
4.1. EU STRATEGY FOR LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS .............................................................. 46 
4.1.1. GROWING IMPORTANCE OF LNG FOR THE EU ...................................................... 47 
4.1.2. CLOSER LOOK AT THE EUROPEAN LNG IMPORT TERMINALS ................................ 48 
4.2. ACCESS TO EU REGASIFICATION CAPACITY - REGULATED VERSUS EXEMPTED 
TERMINALS .......................................................................................................................... 49 
4.3. PRACTICAL CONCIDERATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TPA TO TERMINALS .. 51 
4.3.1. PRIMARY CAPACITY ............................................................................................... 52 
4.3.2. SECONDARY MARKETS - ANTI-HOARDING MEASURES ......................................... 52 
4.3.3. TRANSPARENCY ..................................................................................................... 53 
5. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................... 54 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 58 
 
 
 
  -4- 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The importance of Liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the global gas trade has grown 
considerably over the past decades. Changes in LNG industry facilitated by 
technology breakthroughs, global demand growth, liberalization policies and 
emergence of new players have totally restructured the way global LNG markets 
currently operate. These changes push towards more flexibility, liquidity and 
effective use of terminals' regasification capacity. Nevertheless, these new market 
dynamics that emerge from this transformation will remain useless, if 
regasification terminals which comprise the last part of the LNG value chain, 
remain inaccessible to existing and new players trying to enter the business. 
Europe has imposed a system of regulated third party access to LNG terminals, in 
order to facilitate the entrance of global players seeking to access liquid 
wholesale gas markets and optimize their LNG portfolio. Under these 
circumstances, the role of regasification terminals has changed. They have 
become more flexible and able to respond to prevailing global LNG market 
dynamics. However, access to regasification terminals is not always easy. Complex 
commercial arrangements, existing long-term capacity contracts, operational 
challenges and regulatory barriers need to be taken into account too. Europe 
wants to become a valuable outlet for LNG. Therefore, interest of LNG market 
participants in how TPA is implemented in practice to EU terminals, increases.   
 
 With regard to the structure of this dissertation, Chapter 1 gives an overview of 
the LNG value chain and explains why LNG is considered now a significant traded 
commodity. It also compares LNG with conventional pipeline gas and concludes 
that LNG is more preferable. Lastly, it analyses the evolution of LNG contracts and 
their pricing system. Subsequently, Chapter 2 deals with the evolution of 
European energy regulation. In the beginning, there is a briefly presentation of 
the structure of energy markets before liberalization was initiated by the EU and 
explains the reasons why it took so long for the EU to realize its importance. 
Moreover, the chapter outlines the main provisions of the 3 consecutive 
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legislative packages in relation to gas markets and assesses their effectiveness to 
liberalize the gas sector. Chapter 3 focuses on a specific liberalization policy tool - 
the third party access right. It explains its importance, especially for the gas sector 
which is a network-bound industry, the way it is implemented to receiving 
terminals and presents concerns arising from this implementation. Furthermore, 
the chapter gives further analysis of the exemption mechanism introduced by the 
EU to incentivise investments and raises the issue of the balance that should be 
achieved between granting exemptions and ensuring competition with the 
implementation of TPA. Finally, it highlights the importance of competition tools 
and especially the essential facilities doctrine, in order to ensure TPA and create a 
competitive market structure. Chapter 4 presents the growing importance of LNG 
for the EU and provides an overview of the current access regime applied to 
European regasification terminals. The chapter also analyses practical measures 
adopted by the EU legislation to implement effective TPA to regasification 
terminals and possible issues arising in the current market environment. Finally, 
chapter 5 includes conclusive remarks about the strategy EU has currently 
adopted to facilitate access to regasification terminals and proposes some 
measures, in order for the EU to achieve better results in relation to access issues 
and optimal utilization of the available regasification capacity. 
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1. THE IMPORTANCE OF LIQUEFIED-NATURAL GAS (LNG) IN THE 
GLOBAL GAS TRADE 
 
1.1. WHAT IS LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) 
 
    1.1.1. DEFINITIONS 
 
 Natural gas is a fossil fuel resource and is considered now as a favoured energy 
throughout the world, primarily because of its high efficiency, abundance, 
affordability and environmental benefits, compared to its main fuel competitors: 
oil and coal. The prospects for natural gas are so promising that the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) has suggested that the 21st century could be the "Golden 
Age of Gas."1 Normally, there are two main options for the transportation of 
natural gas from producing regions to consumption regions: either through an 
extensive and elaborate pipeline network or in the form of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), a cost-effective form of natural gas, transported by sea containers and 
tankers. 
 
 LNG is produced by removing impurities from natural gas, which is then cooled to 
approximately -162 oC (-260 oF) at atmospheric pressure until it liquefies, via a 
special cooling process (liquefaction). After the process is complete, the 
substance is compacted to where the liquid occupies only 1/600th of its gas 
volume. Thus, a greater volume of gas can be transported easier and more 
efficiently over long distances in liquefied form. Because LNG must be kept very 
cold in order to remain in a liquid state, storage in insulated tanks is necessary, 
both while awaiting shipment and while on board at specially built refrigerated 
ships.  
 
                                                          
1
 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA). (2011). WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011: ARE WE ENTERING 
A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS?. Paris, France: IEA, pp. 170-172. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2011/WEO2011_GoldenAgeofGasReport.pd
f, accessed 15 November 2017. 
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 1.1.2. LNG VALUE CHAIN 
 
 On reaching the destination point, the LNG will be unloaded from the vessels and 
then, after storage in insulated tanks, it will be regasified at the receiving terminal 
of the importing country by the buyer. Specially equipped regasifiers are used to 
convert the liquefied product into pipeline-quality natural gas. After 
regasification, the resulting gas is piped to power plants and other natural gas 
users. There is no difference between the possible usage of regasified natural gas 
and that of normal pipeline natural gas.2 
 
 As stated above, the global LNG business consists of four stages and has been 
described as a "value chain", which is relatively complex and links at least four 
major projects:  
1) the upstream project for the exploration and production of gas; 
2) the delivery of gas into a liquefaction plant, which represents the second 
infrastructure project and constitutes the largest component of the total 
cost of the LNG value chain. During liquefaction the natural gas that has 
already been cleaned and dried, is converted from gas to a liquid state; 
3) the liquefied gas is thereafter transported via dedicated sea-going LNG 
vessels to markets around the world; 
4) storage and regasification. Once an LNG vessel reaches its destination, it will 
berth and discharge LNG into a facility known as LNG receiving or 
regasification terminal. There, it is stored for a specific period of time in double-
walled insulated tanks at atmospheric pressure3 and depending on the demand 
for natural gas, LNG is regasified so as to become available for delivery by 
                                                          
2
 Weems, P. R. (2017). LNG Export Projects-a Historical View. Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal 
(OGEL), 15(4). 
3
 LNG can only be stored for a limited period of time due to boil off, which is a process whereby the 
liquid returns to a gaseous state as its temperature rises. The boil off gas must be extracted from the 
storage tank. 
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pipeline to consumers. The receiving terminal constitutes the last 
infrastructure project of the LNG value chain.4 
 
The simplified process that natural gas goes through so as to become LNG and to 
return to regasified natural gas, can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: LNG VALUE CHAIN
5 
 
 
1.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LNG INDUSTRY 
 
 International trade of natural gas has historically been linked with pipeline 
networks, since pipeline gas dominated the natural gas business for many 
decades. The need of transporting large amounts of natural gas reserves over 
                                                          
4
 Ambakederemo, T. (2010). LNG sale and purchase agreements: what is the effect of the emerging 
liquefied natural gas spot market on traditional long term liquefied natural gas sale and purchase 
agreements. International Energy Law Review, 5, pp. 155-162. 
5
 Weems, P. R., & Hwang, M. (2013). Overview of issues common to structuring, negotiating and 
documenting LNG projects. Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 6(4), pp. 267-299. 
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long (often overseas) distances boosted the LNG business6. However, over the 
past few years interest in liquefied natural gas has increased considerably, which 
has led to a surge in global and regional LNG trade. LNG supplied about 10 per 
cent of world gas demand in 2010 and its relative importance is increasing, as it 
has surpassed pipeline gas in demand.7 Additionally, between 2001-2014, the 
annual rise in LNG trade was about 9,5%, which is more than twice as much 
(4.5%) compared to the gas sent by pipeline networks.8 As LNG now can be 
reliably transported worldwide, it is considered as a significant traded commodity, 
capable of meeting the growth in demand for natural gas.9 Its increase in 
significance is mainly due to concerns of policy makers about issues related to 
energy security, global climate change, higher natural gas and oil prices as well as 
increase in demand for clean and flexible energy supplies.  
 
 
1.2.1. LNG vs PIPELINE GAS 
 
 LNG plays an important role in the integration of the natural gas markets, since it 
enables the trade between historically distinct regions and the delivery of gas to 
several points. Therefore, it is generally accepted that LNG plays the role of the 
“glue” which links global gas markets.10 Moreover, its flexibility offers a 
competitive advantage over conventional pipeline gas, since LNG can be shipped 
to markets far away from the location of natural gas deposits which are usually 
not located near potential customers. The transportation of gas via pipelines is 
rigid, as it provides limited delivery points, discouraging those selling the 
commodity to redirect it to markets where its price is higher. On the contrary, 
                                                          
6
 Ibid as ref. 4  
7
 Kumar, S., Kwon, H. T., Choi, K. H., Cho, J. H., Lim, W., & Moon, I. (2011). Current status and future 
projections of LNG demand and supplies: A global prospective. Energy Policy, 39(7), pp. 4097-4104. 
8
 Metelska, K., Biały, R., Cieślik, T., Blacharski, T., & Szurlej, A. (2016). The importance of LNG for 
natural gas consumption in the EU. E3S Web Of Conferences, 10, p. 00132.  
9
 Wood, D. A. (2012). A review and outlook for the global LNG trade. Journal of Natural gas science 
and Engineering, 9, pp. 16-27. 
10
 Sakmar, S. L. (2013). Global Gas Markets: The Role of LNG in the Golden Age of Gas and the 
Globalization of LNG Trade. Houston Journal of International Law, 35(3), pp. 655-696.  
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LNG sellers can determine where and to whom the LNG will be sold, since like oil 
it can be dispatched to any destination via sea-going vessels. 
 
  Another advantage of LNG over natural gas is that it can be transported more 
easily, since it occupies less space and the transportation cost becomes cheaper 
as the distance between the gas field and the potential market increases. LNG 
trade around the world has the advantage of there being no statistical 
relationship between the price and the distance for its transportation, while the 
exact opposite stands for CNG trade.11 Specifically, it has been argued that LNG is 
the best option for markets located more than 4000 kilometres away from the gas 
field. However, this number is optional, since the most suitable transportation 
option depends on other parameters as well, such as the volume and the quantity 
of natural gas transported. 12 Lastly, LNG regasification terminals allow receiving 
LNG from diverse suppliers, avoiding dependence on a single supplier through 
pipelines13 as well as dependence on transit countries and the associated legal 
and political risks.14  
 
 1.2.2. LNG EXPORTS-IMPORTS 
 
 Apart from the aforementioned factors, since 2010 some fundamental changes in 
the worldwide energy industry also contributed to the significant evolution of the 
LNG market. Technical advancements concerning manufacturing, treating 
processes, liquefaction, and transportation of LNG as well as economies of scale 
have made LNG cost-effective compared to the past. Furthermore, the shale 
revolution, as a consequence of the innovation of shale technology which reduced 
the costs of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, have resulted in a plethora 
                                                          
11
 Osorio-Tejada, J., Llera-Sastresa, E., & Scarpellini, S. (2017). Liquefied natural gas: Could it be a 
reliable option for road freight transport in the EU?. Renewable And Sustainable Energy Reviews, 71, 
pp. 785-795.  
12
 Ulvestad, M., & Overland, I. (2012). Natural gas and CO2 price variation: impact on the relative cost-
efficiency of LNG and pipelines. International Journal of Environmental Studies, 69(3), pp. 407-426. 
13
 Ibid as ref. 11 
14
 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. 
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of LNG export projects proposed in Australia and North America. These projects 
will change dramatically the global energy and supply environment.  
 
 On the import side, global LNG demand is expected to increase substantially 
especially in Asia and Europe. China and India, which are set to continue driving a 
rise in demand, were two of the fastest-growing buyers in 2016, increasing their 
imports by a combined 11.9 million tonnes of LNG, while countries such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia which are among the major LNG exporters worldwide will 
turn into LNG importing countries by 2035.15 Moreover, after the nuclear damage 
at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors in March 2011, countries changed their nuclear 
policies and started seeking for alternative sources of energy especially for 
flexible LNG supplies. In Europe, the role of LNG has been reassessed and the use 
of LNG is considered to play a key role for diversification of the EU's supplies. 
Specifically, the Union published in February 2016 the EU strategy for liquefied 
natural gas and gas storage, one of several measures under the Energy Union 
package, proposing better cooperation with international partners and further 
efforts towards the utilization of LNG16. The EU has recognised the growing role of 
LNG for the completion of a secure, well- functioning, internal gas market which 
will benefit both individual market players and EU citizens.  
 
  Compared to more established areas of the energy sector, the LNG industry is 
relatively new. However, it is developing at a rapid rate and is expected to 
increase further over time, since it is adapting to a number of factors that have 
fundamentally shifted the supply and demand balance for LNG. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Shell. (2017). SHELL LNG OUTLOOK 2017, pp. 3,4. Retrieved from http://www.shell.com/energy-
and-innovation/natural-gas/liquefied-natural-gas-lng/lng-
outlook/_jcr_content/par/textimage_1374226056.stream/1488553856456/88c077c844a609e05eae5
6198aa1f92d35b6a33cc624cf8e4650a0a6b93c9dfb/shell-lng-outlook-2017-overview.pdf 
16
 European Commission. (2016). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on an EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage. Brussels, 
Belgium: COM(2016) 49 final. 
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1.3. THE STRUCTURE OF LNG CONTRACTS AND THEIR PRICING SYSTEM 
 
 On September 26, 1964, the world's first LNG cargo sold under a long-term 
contract was loaded at the Camel plant in Algeria and was unloaded on October 
12, 1964, at Canvey Island17. Since then LND trade has been expanding 
remarkably, causing drastic changes to the global LNG market structure. 
Historically, the LNG trade has been based on long-term contracts with duration 
being 20-30 years. In addition to most LNG trade occurring regionally, there were 
very few cargoes committed under shorter contracts or on the spot market and 
cargo diversions from the originally intended destinations were limited.  
 
 1.3.1. ADVANTAGES OF LONG-TERM SPA 
 
 Each contract has two sides, a producer (seller) and a buyer (wholesaler). The use 
of long-term sale and purchase agreements (SPAs) were the usual contractual 
arrangement for LNG projects, since they are capital-intensive and have a 
complex nature. Specifically, the philosophy underlying the use of these contracts 
is that both the gas producer and the gas buyer profit from these long-term 
contractual agreements. Moreover, the producer can trust on guaranteed 
payments for a period long enough to cover (a considerable amount of) the costs 
incurred from the investment in exploration, production, long-distance 
transportation, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) liquefaction terminals18 and 
therefore they provide for a security of demand for gas exporters. These contracts 
can also assure long-term security of supply to the buyer, enabling him to adopt 
certain strategies in downstream markets in the medium and long-term and make 
profitable investment decisions based on predictable transportation needs.19  
                                                          
17
 Ibid as ref. 2 
18
 Herweg, N. (2017). European Union policy-making: The Regulatory Shift in Natural Gas Market 
Policy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 
19
 Talus, K. (2011). Long-term natural gas contracts and antitrust law in the European Union and the 
United States. Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 4(3), pp. 260-315i. 
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 1.3.2. DISADVANTAGES OF LONG-TERM SPA 
 
 Nevertheless, long-term contracts are usually rigid and they do not take into 
account possible changes in the market or other circumstances, as their main 
objective when drafted is to enforce the terms of the contract.20 They typically 
contain a destination clause, preventing buyers from re-selling imported gas to 
third parties, they are also structured on a take-or-pay basis for specified volumes 
and their pricing linked to crude oil or a basket of crude oil and refined products is 
frequently adopted. The imposition of these contractual terms inhibit the ability 
of LNG to be traded freely and do not allow the global LNG business to grow as it 
really should.  
 
 In more detail, destination clauses which prohibit the buyer of natural gas to 
resell it in other areas than initially contracted for, give LNG sellers the option to 
charge different clients different prices for the same product at the same delivery 
point21. Moreover, a take-or-pay clause obliges the buyer to pay for a 
contractually agreed amount of LNG, usually more than 80 percent of the annual 
contracted quantity, whether or not this amount is taken, in prices that are 
defined in advance22. Regarding their pricing system, LNG has traditionally been 
priced as natural gas via pipeline, linked to oil prices. The practice of tying the gas 
price to the movements of oil prices was developed at a time when there was no 
independent and transparent gas price in the relevant markets. Gas was seen as a 
substitute for other types of fuels and there was practically no gas-to-gas 
competition.23 This linkage was used because the world oil market is highly liquid 
and transparent, so price volatility and conspiracy in regions with few LNG 
suppliers would be avoided. 
 
                                                          
20
 Ibid as ref. 4 
21
 Ibid as ref. 19 
22
 Ibid as ref. 18 
23
 Talus, K. (Ed.). (2014). Research handbook on international energy law. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
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 1.3.3. EMERGENCE OF NEW TYPES OF CONTRACTS 
 
 Nevertheless, since the mid 1990s changes are under way in world natural gas 
markets, creating new forms of contracts with more flexible terms, which 
properly reflect the LNG trade today. With the dramatic increase in cargoes, 
trading routes and market participants in combination with changes in the 
institutional framework, which have moved the industry away from monopolistic 
structures towards competition, LNG markets have seen the emergence of a 
growing spot and short-term LNG trade. These types of contracts allow divertible 
or uncommitted LNG to go to the highest value market in response to changing 
market conditions24 and provide for flexibility and optimization of the purchasing 
portfolio of LNG importers while securing resiliency and better market utilization.  
 
 Over-the-counter spot sales in the LNG sector consist of two groups: genuine 
single cargo spot sales and short-term sales25. In short-term sales, there is a series 
of LNG cargo sales based on short-term contracts, usually with the duration of 
less than 4 years.26,27 A spot trade implies that a single or several LNG cargoes are 
produced by the LNG plant but is (are) not committed to any specific market by 
the project. In such a case, there will be several markets willing and ready to pay 
different prices for the cargoes28. Generally, these new types of contracts look like 
long-term sale and purchase agreement (SPAs) when drafted, except that they 
contain more flexible terms. The main difference between them is that they do 
not contain take or pay provisions, their pricing structure is negotiable and 
                                                          
24
 Sakmar, S. L. (2013). Energy for the 21st century: Opportunities and challenges for liquefied natural 
gas (LNG). Edward Elgar Publishing. 
25
 There is no universally accepted definition of ‘short term’ in the LNG business. The short -term LNG 
market is generally considered the market where sales are governed by agreements with a duration 
of less than 4 years. The LNG industry sometimes uses ‘short term’ and ‘spot’ interchangeably which 
challenges the ordinary meaning of the term ‘spot’. 
26
 Nikhalat-Jahromi, H., Angeloudis, P., Bell, M. G., & Cochrane, R. A. (2017). Global LNG trade: A 
comprehensive up to date analysis. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 19(1), pp. 160-181. 
27
 According to the International Gas Union (IGU) short-term trade is defined as all volumes traded 
under agreements of less than two years and contracts with duration between two to less than five 
years are called medium-term contracts, see also: International Gas Union (IGU) (2017). 2017 World 
LNG Report.  
28
 Ibid as ref. 4 
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destination clauses are either eliminated or have become more flexible, allowing 
the expansion of arbitrage trades29 of LNG.  
 
 Recent forms of long-term contracts aim to make available a base supply of LNG, 
while spot contracts are just playing a supplementary role, for example in periods 
of high demand or in the event of a supply disruption. However, more and more 
buyers and sellers are entering into spot arrangements globally, since spot trade 
is valuable to both contracting parties. On the one hand, the seller can trade off 
excess capacity and on the other hand the buyer can procure LNG with more 
flexibility.30 The spot contracts are able to balance flexibility with certainty, since 
they provide more trading opportunities, enhance competition, make LNG trade 
more liquid, dynamic and multi-directional, while trying to create a global LNG 
market, where the price of LNG is driven by the fundamentals of supply and 
demand with the use of trading hubs. In 2000 short-term and spot trade in LNG 
accounted for less than 5% of the natural gas traded worldwide. However, it grew 
from 2.5 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in 2005 to 9.3 Bcf/d in 2014, and its 
share of total LNG trade increased from 13% to 29%.31 In 2016, the non long-term 
LNG trade reached 72.3 MT (about 10,6 Bcf/d) and accounted for 28% of the total 
LNG trade.32 
 
 
                                                          
29
 LNG arbitrage can be defined as a physical cargo diversion from one market to another which 
offers a higher price. The diversion of the cargo can be regarded as arbitrage if the cargo was 
initially committed to the first market and to the initial buyer in a commercial contract, see also: 
Zhuravleva, P. (2009). The Nature of LNG Arbitrage: an Analysis of the Main Barriers to the Growth of 
the Global LNG Arbitrage Market. Oxford Institute For Energy Studies, NG-31, pp. 2-3. 
30
 Ibid as ref. 4 
31
 Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2016). International energy outlook 2016 with projections 
to 2040. Washington, US. 
32
 International Gas Union (IGU) (2017). 2017 World LNG Report. 
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FIGURE 2: GLOBAL LNG TRADE BY CONTRACT TYPE, 2010 AND 2014 (billion cubic feet per day)
33
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: NON LONG-TERM VOLUMES, 1995-2016
34
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 Ibid as ref. 31 
34
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 1.3.4. LNG PRICING SYSTEM 
 
 Regarding the pricing system of LNG, it has traditionally been linked to oil prices 
under long-term contracts, as noted earlier. However, this system is currently 
heavily debated, since it does not allow transparent gas price indexes to emerge 
which properly reflect the actual supply and demand for LNG itself. For this 
reason, in recent years, with the expansion of spot transactions the fuel is traded 
at several hubs around the world. Currently, there is not a single pricing structure 
for LNG and its pricing mechanism differs between markets depending on their 
respective features and conditions.  
 
 Specifically, international gas markets are divided into 3 major regions. The 
European and North American market (the market around Canada and the U.S), 
both of which are based upon imports and domestic production and the Asian 
market (Northeast Asia, China and India) which depends on LNG imports to a 
great extent, since it does not have large (or even no) indigenous supplies and 
limited pipeline interconnections. In North America, natural gas price is linked to 
gas market indicators such as the Henry Hub in Louisiana (US), while in Europe 
there are two pricing types for natural gas, the price traded at hubs for example 
the National Balancing Point (NBB) in the United Kingdom and the Title Transfer 
Facility (TTF) in Netherlands and the pricing linked to oil or oil products. In other 
words, in Europe there are now two gas prices that compete each other. The 
lower gas-hub short-term prices since 2008, have caused many European gas 
utilities to try and renegotiate the price indexation of their long-term gas 
contracts, particularly with Gazprom of Russia. As a consequence, this move 
increased the competitiveness of short-term LNG across the continent.35 
 
 In Asia, LNG contracts are linked to the crude oil price index. However, due to 
constant demand growth for LNG in the Asian market and high oil prices, natural 
gas is more expensive in Asia than in the USA or Europe, fact that created intense 
                                                          
35
 Wood, D. A. (2012). A review and outlook for the global LNG trade. Journal of Natural gas science 
and Engineering, 9, pp. 16-27. 
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debate about the current pricing system. Under these circumstances, the 
establishment of trading hubs which will enable purchasers to trade LNG at 
reasonable prices that reflect the actual supply and demand of LNG is crucial, in 
order to expand spot transactions and by extension competition in Asian markets.  
 
 The integration of the North American, European and Asian markets to create a 
global LNG market is unlikely to be achieved without the establishment of a 
uniform international pricing structure for LNG. However, structural and 
regulatory reforms in the industry are already underway which will endeavour to 
create greater competition, freer and more transparent trading and better market 
environment in which LNG prices will be stabilized and will reflect the actual 
supply and demand for the fuel.  
 
 
 
2. LIBERALIZATION OF EUROPEAN GAS MARKETS-THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. THE PRE-LIBERALIZATION PHASE-TOWARDS EU MARKET REFORM 
  
 The creation of a single market as a barrier-free zone for business and consumers 
across Europe is one of the European Union's main goals. Despite all 
achievements of recent decades, the process of establishing a single market has 
not yet been accomplished. This is especially true for the internal energy 
market.36 Especially, given the vital role energy plays in the modern globalizing 
and competitive world, it is quite surprising that it took so long for the European 
Union to focus on creating a well-functioning, competitive internal energy market 
in order to complete an important part of the EU single market.  
  
                                                          
36
 Krüger, H. (2016). European Energy Law and Policy: An Introduction. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
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 2.1.1. REASONS IMPEDING FOCUS ON ENERGY MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN THE EU 
 
 Specifically, regarding the gas sector, the process of liberalizing the EU gas 
market has been extremely slow and can be traced back to the mid-1980s. This 
happened mostly due to the fact that neither the EEC Treaty (1957) which was 
created to establish a common market for goods, services and labour among 
member states, nor the Maastricht Treaty (1992) which founded the European 
Union provided the Community with an all-encompassing competency in the field 
of energy. Many different considerations played their part in keeping energy 
issues off the general EC agenda. Until 1990 the European Commission (EC) was 
concerned mainly on issues regarding security of supply, not competition and the 
gas market liberalization was not significant subject for the EC to deal with. A 
perceived scarcity of supply resulted from the belief that finite resources would 
soon be depleted in combination with international focusing events such as the 
closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and 1967, the oil crises caused by the Arab oil 
embargo in 1973, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the skyrocketing of crude oil 
prices during the 1970s, led member states to treat energy as a strategic 
commodity, which had to be dealt with at a national level.37 Since energy was 
considered a highly sensitive subject for the EU, each member state government 
was trying to retain tight control over the sector, maintaining at the same time its 
own distinct approach to meeting its energy needs according to its individual 
wishes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 Ibid as ref. 18 
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 2.1.2 STRUCTURE OF ENERGY MARKETS BEFORE LIBERALIZATION 
 
 Furthermore, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the European electricity and gas 
supply industries were dominated by national monopolies. The status of 
monopoly in the energy market was deployed by companies owned by public 
stakeholders which wielded a significant amount of power and could favour their 
own corporate divisions, since they had the means to block new entrants. 
However, this monopolistic structure in the downstream market38 was considered 
necessary given the substantial cost required to build and maintain the network 
infrastructure. On top of that, these monopolies were vertically integrated 
undertakings (VIU) which meant that they were responsible for the extraction or 
generation, supply, transmission and distribution of the energy. As the services 
provided by these vertically integrated companies were seen as essential for the 
community, governments have used to impose public service obligations (PSO) on 
them, such as the obligation to supply or to base prices on the incurred costs and 
leave them under governmental control in an effort to control them and protect 
the consumers39.  
 
 These energy firms could discriminate against potential entrants and by 
extension hinder competition40 and since they controlled every part of the 
electricity and gas value chain, they could even dictate prices at their sole 
discretion. This also led to inefficiency in services and under-investment in energy 
infrastructure.41 Therefore, these malfunctions in energy sector forced the EU to 
                                                          
38
 In general, the natural gas market can be subdivided into an upstream market and a downstream 
market. The upstream market encompasses those activities related to natural gas which involve 
exploration, development, production, gathering and purification as well as sales to wholesalers. The 
downstream market refers to the transmission, distribution and storage of natural gas, see also: ref 
18.  
39
 Ibid as ref. 18 
40
 Nowak, B. (2010). Equal access to the energy infrastructure as a precondition to promote 
competition in the energy market. The case of European Union. Energy Policy, 38(7), pp. 3691-3700. 
41
 The construction and maintenance of energy infrastructure (pipelines, storage facilities, LNG 
terminals) is capital-intensive. Due to the required high investments, a subadditive cost function is 
given, which means that once the infrastructure is built, additional customers can be 
served at low marginal costs. Hence, their construction and operation is left to the natural 
monopolies, which have an incentive to use their dominant positions to deny access to the 
infrastructure of potential competitors and by extension to slow down market opening for new 
players. Not surprisingly, the prevailing market situation in the European member states prior to the 
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start a gradual but significant reform process towards the abolition of this 
monopolistic structure and the development of a liberalization regime which 
would promote a more efficient energy sector with more consumer choice of 
energy products and services and lower electricity and gas prices. 
 
 The previous picture in the energy sector started to change in the late 1980s 
when calls for privatization and deregulation became commonplace particularly in 
the UK and US. The successful energy market liberalization experienced by these 
countries encouraged many European leaders to begin gradually opening up 
national markets to competition. A state-controlled sector started slowly to 
change into something more market- oriented. The idea was that, as a result of 
such competition, the markets would become more efficient and consumers 
would benefit both from lower prices and from the freedom to choose from a 
wider range of suppliers. Additionally, investment in energy infrastructures would 
be conducted on a market- oriented basis and at the lowest possible cost. 
Governments could step aside and limit their role, in order to ensure the proper 
functioning of the market42. 
 
 
 2.1.3. FIRST STEPS TOWARDS AN INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET  
 
 In 1988, the Commission published the white paper entitled "The Internal Energy 
Market" with the aim of EU member states to establish a single market by 1992. 
From that point on, liberalization of gas and electricity markets has occupied an 
important place by the Commission agenda43. Afterwards, a directive introducing 
a Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices 
charged to industrial end-users was adopted to help determine the price 
differences between member states and hence the level of market integration in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
liberalization process has been coined by monopolies in the downstream market, see also: ref 18 and 
ref 40.  
42
 Talus, K. (2016). Introduction to EU energy law. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. 
43
 Cerovic, L., Donadić, M., & Galović, T. (2009). Liberalization of EU Gas Sector: Impacts and 
Perspectives of Future Development. 
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the gas and electricity sectors44. In 1990 and 1991 directives on electricity and gas 
transit were also adopted to provide a framework for the exchange of electricity 
and gas between incumbent operators to strengthen security of supply and 
reduce costs45. The Price Transparency Directive and the Electricity and Gas 
Transit Directive can be regarded as the first, preliminary steps to the opening-up 
of the European energy markets to competition46. However, although this set of 
legislation had little real effect, they set the wheels in motion for the adoption by 
the EU of the first Electricity Directive in 199647, followed by the first Gas Directive 
in 199848 that put the internal European energy market on the path to change. 
 
 
2.2. THE FIRST GAS DIRECTIVE 
 
 Within the first energy liberalization package, the so called first Electricity 
Directive was adopted in December 1996 and had to be transposed by February 
1999. This electricity directive paved the way for the first gas directive which was 
adopted in June 1998 and had to be transported by August 2000. The essence of 
both the electricity and gas market directives is the introduction of freedom of 
choice to engage in the business of energy trade, the choice to build power plants 
and pipelines, to export and import and the choice to select and negotiate with 
suppliers, shippers, and customers49. The directives also aimed to move from a 
system of vertically integrated companies, often with legal supply monopolies, to 
a system that distinguished between areas where competition was possible and 
                                                          
44
 Council Directive No. 90/377, O.J. L 185/16, at 16-17 (1990) (concerning a Community procedure to 
improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial end-users). 
45
 Council Directive No. 90/547, O.J. L 313/30, at 30 (1990) (on the transit of electricity through 
transmission grids); Council Directive No. 91/296, O.J. L 147/37, at 37-38 (1991) (on the transit of 
natural gas through grids). 
46
 Kavoussi, F. (2001). Liberalization of European Gas Market. SPE Annual Technical Conference and 
Exhibition. Society of Petroleum Engineers. 
47
 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity, Official Journal, L 27, 30.01.1997. 
48
 Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas, Official Journal L 204, 21.07.1998.  
49
 Talus, K. (2013). EU energy law and policy: a critical account. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press. 
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areas of natural monopoly to which other undertakings would have access at a 
reasonable cost50. 
 
 Specifically, the EU Gas Directive sets the platform for the creation of a full 
competitive European gas market through common rules for transmission, 
distribution, supply and storage, based on high standards of security of supply 
and consumer protection. The cornerstones of the first Gas Directive are set by 
market opening and initial steps towards changing the industry structure and 
network access conditions by introducing accounting unbundling and negotiated 
and regulated third party access.51 In more detail, to achieve a gradual and 
incremental market opening, the EU chose the definition of eligible customer as 
the key variable to facilitate legal market opening. As key element of the gas 
market liberalization was the eligible customers' freedom to choose gas suppliers. 
The Gas Directive allowed member states to attain this goal through a gradual 
market opening consisting of three main phases.52 
 
 
2.2.1. INTRODUCTION OF TPA 
 
 Regarding the introduction of third party access (TPA), two types of access to 
infrastructure can be chosen: regulated or negotiated. Negotiated access refers to 
access on the basis of voluntary commercial agreements negotiated in good faith 
between network operators and users53. The network operator is required to 
publish the main commercial conditions for the use of its network or facility on an 
ex-ante basis. The commercial conditions may include for example the contractual 
terms, the product offered, the rules and technical requirements as well as 
                                                          
50
 Kroes, N. (2007). Improving competition in European Energy markets through effective 
unbundling. Fordham Int'l LJ, 31, pp. 1387-1441. 
51
 Haase, N. (2008). European gas market liberalisation: are regulatory regimes moving towards 
convergence?. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
52
 see also Article 18 of the first Gas Directive 98/30/EC. 
53
 see also Article 15 of the First Gas Directive 98/30/EC.  
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examples of prices.54 By contrast, regulated third party access is based on 
published and common tariffs55 that offer more transparency and non-
discriminatory network access to new entrants. Independent from the member 
states’ preference with regard to negotiated or regulated third party access, the 
organisation of the network access shall be “in accordance with objective, 
transparent and non-discriminatory criteria”56 Moreover, the first Directive 
foresees for both nTPA and rTPA the possibility of temporary derogations, “if a 
natural gas undertaking encounters, or considers it would encounter, serious 
economic and financial difficulties because of its Take-or-Pay commitments 
accepted in one or more gas purchase contracts”.57 In addition, Article 17 of the 
Directive 98/30/EC explicitly allows the refusal of network access in the case of 
capacity congestion caused by pre-liberalisation Take-or-Pay contract obligations.  
 
 2.2.2. UNBUNDLING OF ACCOUNTS 
 
 Lastly, The first Gas Directive requires the publication of accounts of integrated 
gas undertakings which shall also keep separate accounts in their internal 
accounting for their natural gas transmission, distribution and storage activities as 
they would be required to do if the activities were carried out by separate 
undertakings.58 The aim of this requirement is to ensure non-discrimination and 
fair tariffs to avoid cross-subsidisation and the distortion of competition.59 
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 Corbeau, A. S., Volk, D., Sinton, J., Jiang, J., Ping, J., Teng, T., ... & Fen, Y. (2012). Gas Pricing and 
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 see also Article 16 of the first Gas Directive 98/30/EC. 
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 see also Article 14 of the first Gas Directive 98/30/EC. 
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 see also Article 25 of the first Gas Directive 98/30/EC. 
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 see also Article 13 of the first Gas Directive 98/30/EC. 
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 Cameron, P. (2002). Competition in Energy Markets. Law and Regulation in the European Union. 
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 2.2.3. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FIRST GAS DIRECTIVE 
 
 However, in the years immediately following the implementation of the directive, 
it became clear that the requirements were not sufficient and did not cause 
significant changes in the EU gas market. Firstly, the legislation prescribed only 
incremental and moderate market opening, by setting minimum thresholds that 
allowed different degrees of liberalisation to coexist. Furthermore, it left member 
states a large margin of discretion regarding crucial regulatory issues such as the 
degree of required unbundling of monopoly activities in vertically integrated 
undertakings. The result was a European patchwork of asymmetric national 
rules.60 The Commission also carried out a number of benchmarking exercises, 
which demonstrated clearly that in member states where limited unbundling took 
place, competition was severely restricted and discrimination was common.61 
Member states were still discriminating against third-party market players and 
catering to the state-run conglomerates. The first Gas Directive simply had not 
been forceful enough or suggested enough change to precipitate any real change 
in the market.62 For this reason, a second liberalization package was adopted as a 
remedy, in order to speed up the liberalization process that would create a fully 
functional and competitive electricity and gas market.  
 
 
2.3. THE SECOND GAS DIRECTIVE 
 
 In order to tackle the aforementioned difficulties surrounding the first Gas 
Directive, the Community legislator adopted the second energy liberalization 
package.63 The main aim was to strengthen the unbundling requirements of 
                                                          
60
 Eberlein, B. (2008). The making of the European energy market: The interplay of governance and 
government. Journal of Public Policy, 28(1), pp. 73-92. 
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 Ibid as ref. 50 
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 Duncan, C. A. (2015). Lessons from the United States and Texas: Market Liberalization of the 
Natural Gas and Electricity Markets in Europe. Texas Journal of Oil, Gas and Energy Law, 10(2), pp. 
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 The second energy package included Directive 2003/ 55/ EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 98/ 30/ EC, Official Journal, L 176, 15.7.2003; Directive 2003/ 54/ EC of the European 
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network operators, to improve third party access rights, to open electricity and 
gas markets even further by removing the remaining exclusive supply rights and 
to establish independent authorities for the regulation of the natural gas market. 
More specifically, under the second Gas Directive the central position of third 
party access was enhanced and its requirements became stricter. In effect, a 
general shift was made to allow regulated TPA (RTPA) only in almost all cases64: 
negotiated TPA (NTPA) remained as an option only for storage facilities and 
linepack65.  
 
2.3.1. INTRODUCTION OF EXEMPTION MECHANISMS  
 
 The possibility for member states to exempt new gas infrastructure 
(interconnectors, LNG and storage facilities) from third-party access, and from 
some other provisions of the Directive 2003/ 55/ EC was also provided66. This 
Article was considered as a key element for the facilitation of new infrastructure 
(or alternatively for significant increases in existing infrastructure enabling the 
development of new sources of gas supply). The rationale behind Article 22 is risk 
mitigation for infrastructure which will increase the level of competition between 
member states. Regulators are required to decide on a case by case basis on the 
exemption.67 
 
 The Regulation 1775/2005 also confirmed and emphasised the regulated third-
party access and determined more detailed terms and conditions for this 
instrument. Furthermore, the Regulation specified capacity allocation 
mechanisms and capacity congestion mechanisms and clearly stated that unused 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity and repealing Directive 96/ 92/ EC, Official Journal, L 176, 15.7.2003; Regulation (EC) No 
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 see also Article 19 and 20 of the second Gas Directive 2003/ 55/ EC. 
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capacity must be offered to other parties. Nonetheless, though the Regulation 
filled existing regulatory gaps, its scope was complementary rather than 
deepening or widening68. 
 
 As for unbundling, while the first directive stipulates account unbundling for 
vertically integrated natural gas undertakings, the second one adds (with few 
exemptions) functional and legal unbundling for its distribution and transmission 
activities69. The unbundling idea is based on the Transmission System Operator or 
Distribution System Operator having efficient decision making rights which will 
allow them to make decisions in their own right and interests, independent from 
the interests of the trading branch of the integrated company.70 
 
 Under the second Gas Directive, the timetable according to which member states 
were required to open their energy markets to customer choice and competition 
was also amended to accelerate the process.71 Specifically Article 23 foresees the 
freedom of choice of supplier for all European non-households from 1 July 2004, 
and for all costumers from 1 July 2007. 
 
 This Directive also included provisions addressing directly consumer protection72 
and security of supply73 and introduced significant developments with regard to 
national regulatory authorities. This was partly a result of the move towards more 
widespread use of regulated TPA, but also reflected a concern to ensure that 
there were strong and independent national regulators able to ensure respect for 
the complex market and regulatory compromise embodied by the new 
legislation.74 In November 2003, the Commission created the European 
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), to give informal co-operation 
between national regulators a more formal status. The purpose of this advisory 
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group is to advise and assist the Commission in consolidating the internal energy 
market.75 
 
 
 2.3.2. NOT A REAL CHANGE YET-NEED FOR FURTHER REFORMS 
 
 Unfortunately, the energy industry proved to be a very complex level playing 
field. Despite all these efforts made by the European Commission towards the 
liberalization of the internal energy market with the adoption of the second 
package, still there were many unsolved issues that had to be faced. Against a 
background of high gas and electricity wholesale prices, complaints about entry 
barriers and limited possibilities to exercise consumer choice, in 2005 the 
Commission decided to launch a formal investigation, so as to discover exactly the 
causes preventing the European internal market from reaching full liberalization 
(the Sector Inquiry).76 The final report was published in 2007, after a 18-month 
investigation and unfortunately its findings were disappointing. Market 
concentration, vertical foreclosure, limited market integration, lack of market 
transparency and limited competition in the downstream markets were some of 
the shortcomings identified in the Sector Inquiry77. Taking into account the results 
from the inquiry, the EU proceeded to further reforms by adopting a third 
liberalization package, in order to boost the national efforts towards the creation 
of a well-functioning, integrated and competitive energy market.  
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2.4. THE THIRD GAS DIRECTIVE  
 
 In July 2009, the third energy liberalization package was adopted78, seeking to 
further open up the gas and electricity markets in the European Union, boost 
competition, enhance investments and resolve structural failings in the energy 
sector. The latest Gas Directive focused on the issues related to unbundling, 
regulatory oversight and cooperation, network cooperation, transparency and 
network keeping and finally access to networks (transmission and distribution 
system), storage facilities and LNG terminals.  
 
 2.4.1. MAIN PROVISIONS 
 
 The main feature of the Directive 2009/73/EC is the introduction of ownership 
unbundling of natural gas transmission activities from production or supply 
activities as the most effective and stable way to solve conflicts of interest within 
vertically integrated energy companies and to ensure non-discriminatory third 
party access to infrastructure and transparency in the markets. The Directive also 
provides for two alternatives to the ownership unbundling model. Member states 
may choose to designate an independent system operator (ISO) according to 
Article 14 of Directive 2009/73/EC, or an independent transmission operator (ITO) 
according to chapter IV of the same Directive, taking into account the objective 
criteria set in Article 9 part 8. Furthermore, exemptions from the requirements of 
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Article 9 can be granted for major new gas infrastructure under certain 
circumstances79 and derogations from Article 9 may also be considered in cases of 
emergent and isolated markets.80 The Gas Directive also provides for an 
unbundling regime for distribution system operators (DSOs) which are governed 
by the requirements of legal, functional and accounting unbundling, exactly like it 
was required in the preceding regime and are not subject to ownership 
unbundling.  
 
 Third-party access to gas transmission and distributions systems is primarily 
governed by chapter VII of the Gas Directive and by the Gas Regulation. The Gas 
Directive defines member states' general duty to opt for the model of regulated 
third-party access to transmission and distribution systems and LNG facilities81 
while for storage facilities and linepack, member states may still choose between 
negotiated and regulated access.82 The Directive also grants the right for natural 
gas undertakings to refuse access to the system in certain circumstances83 but 
each request is being examined on a case by case basis, in order to verify if the 
criteria set for the application of an exemption are met.  
 
 In terms of access to natural gas transmission networks, the provisions of the Gas 
Directive are complemented by Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 which aims to set 
fair rules for access conditions to natural gas transmission systems, LNG facilities 
and storage facilities. Moreover, the Regulation focuses on developing a well-
functioning wholesale market, harmonising the network access rules for cross-
border exchanges in gas84 and underlining the principles of capacity allocation 
mechanisms and congestion management procedures. 
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 2.4.2. FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS LIBERALIZATION 
 
 One of the most important features of the Directive 2009/73/EC is related with 
strengthening the independency and expanding the tasks of the national 
regulatory authorities, while providing the conditions for cooperation of the 
European Regulatory Institutions of the energy sector, both at regional and EU 
level85. The Gas Directive also provides the duty of member states’ regulatory 
institutions to cooperate on inter-state questions and the duties to cooperate 
with the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (the Agency) 
established by Regulation 713/2009. The purpose of the Agency is to assist the 
regulatory authorities at the EU level to perform their regulatory tasks in the 
member states and where necessary, coordinate their activities.86 Furthermore, 
both the Directive and in more detail the Gas Regulation 715/2009 impose on 
member states' transmission system operators to cooperate at regional and EU 
level. All the aforementioned provisions regarding the regional and European 
cooperation of the regulatory institutions, in combination with the increasing 
reporting obligation imposed on them, seek to ensure respect for the new rules of 
the third package, while this new regime aims to gather more information to 
assess the impact, successes and difficulties of the latest EU legislation. With a 
clearer overview of the operation of markets under these rules, national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs), ACER and the Commission hope to develop more 
effective regulation compared to the previous ones adopted as time progresses, 
from a stronger and fuller knowledge base.87 
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 2.4.3. CHALLENGES-NEW PACKAGE OF MEASURES ON THE WAY 
 
 However, though the EU with the latest package adopted a fundamentally new 
approach in order to change the structure of the European gas market, its goal of 
completing the internal market has proved elusive. In February 2011 the 
European Council set the objective of completing the internal energy market ‘by 
2014 but by June 2016 the European Council called for ‘Single Market strategies 
‘including energy and actions plans to be proposed by the Commission and to be 
completed by 2018. Indeed, full and timely transposition of the complex 
provisions of the third package had been a challenge for most member states and 
in fact none of the member states had achieved full transposition by the deadline 
of March 2011.88 Therefore, since new regulatory packages are considered 
necessary, in order for the EU to achieve its goals, in November 2016 the 
Commission proposed a set of new measures with the aim to improve the current 
framework.89 
 
3. ANALYSIS OF THIRD PARTY ACCESS (TPA) RIGHT UNDER EU ENERGY 
LEGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
  
 
3.1. DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE OF TPA RIGHT 
 
 Many modifications have taken place in the energy sector the last couple of 
years. One of great significance was the liberalization process of the energy 
markets promoted by the European Union since the late 1990s. This move from a 
state-driven system towards a greater market-oriented policy sought to open up 
energy markets to foreign competitive forces, while replacing vertically integrated 
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companies owned by the state with private firms operating in a liberal market 
environment. The initial idea for the creation of these new energy market rules 
emerged when the European Commission realized that the monopolistic structure 
of the energy sector hampered the development of a well-functioning internal 
energy market, which guarantees efficiency, secure and reliable supplies at 
affordable prices and more choices and protection for the final consumers. This 
recognition and change in ideology about the structure of the energy business 
accompanied by technological improvements which promised more flexibility for 
the market participants, led to the introduction of what is known as the third 
party access right into this new regulatory regime, as a key part of such market 
reform.  
 
 
 3.1.1. INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION IN NETWORK-BOUND SECTORS 
 
 Natural gas and electricity markets are network-bound sectors, which means that 
they combine activities that are potentially competitive, such as 
generation/production and supply, with ones that are naturally monopolistic, like 
transmission and distribution of electricity and gas. This combination creates a lot 
of challenges for the introduction of competition and the maximization of the 
liberalization benefits and for this reason, coordination between monopolistic and 
competitive elements of the supply chain as well as appropriate regulation and 
control of any tendency towards monopolistic abuse/behaviour are considered 
crucial. These industries are dependent on infrastructure, so access to these 
facilities is essential for competition to emerge. However, these facilities are 
capital-intensive and the risk as well as uncertainty regarding market demand and 
price of the offered commodity expose the profitability of the project, while this 
move towards more competition through liberalization policies create concerns 
to the incumbent firms about losing their market share and revenues when 
sharing their facilities with third parties. Regarding the gas sector third party 
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access (TPA) is provided to the European gas transmission and distribution 
facilities and in the LNG sector this right will be to the regasification terminals.  
 
 
 3.1.2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TPA AND UNBUNDLING 
 
 Due to the natural monopoly character of the network systems, which are owned 
and operated by vertical integrated companies, there is a conflict of interest 
between the neutral role the operators must have towards all market participants 
and their privileged position, which inevitably leads to discrimination tactics 
between their own integrated supply affiliates and independent third parties 
seeking to gain access to the system. The response to this behaviour, as it has 
already been mentioned, is the effective unbundling of the market segments, a 
step which was taken by the EC towards the liberalization of the energy market, in 
order for competition to finally emerge. In other words, unbundling is a concept 
fundamentally related to open access to infrastructure, since only in this way the 
strong relation between the network operator and affiliated companies ceases to 
exist or becomes weaker and incentives to refuse access are reduced. Without 
such right energy producers and suppliers cannot reach the final customers and 
cannot trade and by extension an open internal energy market where customers 
have the right to choose their suppliers freely, cannot be achieved. The 
elimination of such barriers of entrance is an essential prerequisite for the 
introduction of competition, since new players will enter the business, 
contributing to diversification and security of supply and ensuring sustainability 
and effective functioning of the energy markets. 
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 3.1.3. DEFINITION OF TPA 
 
 In practice, TPA is defined as the idea that under certain circumstances, 
economically independent undertakings operating in the energy sector have the 
legally enforceable right to access and use various energy network facilities 
owned by other companies.90 This right is established by the First, Second and 
Third liberalization package and it is considered to be a fundamental liberalization 
policy tool and an indispensable component of competitive markets. However, 
there is no clear definition of what TPA really is and though article 32 of the Third 
Electricity and Gas Directive states that member states should ensure the 
implementation of a system of third party access, no further guidance is given 
towards this direction. The only way to secure this right is through the 
designation of an independent regulatory authority who regulates the 
implementation of such system and is entrusted with all the regulatory duties and 
powers provided for in the Electricity and Gas Directives. 
 
 
 3.1.4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE 
 
 In principle, third party access can be implemented in two ways. Under the first 
model, the access granted is based on a system in which tariffs are published in 
advance and it is applicable to all eligible customers. Additionally, access terms 
and conditions are approved by the energy market regulator and are applied 
objectively and without discrimination between system users.91 The system 
described above is called regulated third party access. Under the second system, 
the terms and conditions of access are negotiated between the system operator 
and each supply undertaking or eligible customer, in order to conclude supply 
contracts, based on voluntary commercial agreements. In negotiated third party 
access there is no requirement for tariffs to be published in advance. However, 
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for the promotion of transparency and the facilitation of negotiations under the 
second regime the publication of an indicative range of prices for standard 
services by the system operator is necessary.  
 
 However, it should be noted that the TPA right under the current regulatory 
framework is not an autonomous right, but is related to an underlying energy 
supply contract expressed by the concept of <<eligibility>>.92 More specifically, 
Art 20 and Art 18 of the third Electricity and Gas Directive respectively clearly 
stipulate that the TPA right is applicable exclusively to supply contracts with 
eligible customers, which means that system users are able to demand access, but 
only if they have to execute a supply contract with an eligible customer. In other 
words, energy traders can reserve network capacity in the incumbent's 
infrastructure for the purpose of performing an actual contract, but they cannot 
rely on the internal energy market Directives, if they want to reserve pure 
capacity for resale or future use. Instead, they can use competition law tools to 
support such claims or resort to commercial negotiations with the system 
operator.93 Nevertheless, national legislators can impose further requirements for 
the opening of the market to competition, by allowing supply undertakings to 
demand a right to pure capacity, in order to sell it to other energy undertakings. 
This case would create a secondary market in capacity trading and would enable 
the creation of more competition and liquidity in the energy markets.  
 
 
3.2. LNG ACCESS REGULATION IN THE EU 
 
 The implementation of TPA to LNG regasification terminals in the EU has taken 
place within the framework of the liberalization of gas markets. Before the 
adoption of the first energy package, third party access to LNG terminals owned 
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and operated by vertical integrated undertakings was almost impossible. With the 
introduction of the first Gas Directive Member states were obliged to opt for 
regulated or negotiated third party access to LNG terminals. Nevertheless, due to 
the fact that  countries like Spain which adopted the first option, achieved better 
results in terms of access conditions and development of competition, contrary to 
others which opted for negotiated TPA, EU decided to exclude the second option 
and impose only regulated access to LNG receiving terminals under the second 
Gas Directive. At this point, it should be mentioned that, although regulated TPA 
is more effective in terms of creating new market entry possibilities, more 
transparent and entails less transaction costs when arranging access, negotiated 
TPA offers more certainty and predictability in the rate of return on capital spent 
for the construction of new terminals. Therefore, the second Gas Directive 
introduced a TPA exemption regime applicable to new terminals or to expansions 
of existing ones, in order to create investment incentives and promote 
competition in the long-term.  
 
 The third Gas Directive followed the same approach as the second one and 
maintained regulated access as a default regime for LNG terminals, introducing, 
however, further requirements on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms (CAM) and 
Congestion Management Procedures (CMP). Regulation 715/2009 also defined 
certain aspects related to how LNG terminal operators should offer third party 
access services.94 The possibility of granting exemptions under certain conditions 
was also maintained the same, which resulted in the coexistence of two regimes, 
regulated TPA and exemptions to it, sometimes applied to the same country or 
even to the same terminal (Italy).  
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 3.2.1. MAIN PROVISIONS AFFECTING LNG OPERATIONS 
 
 In the Directive 2009/73/EC the main articles affecting LNG operations are Art 8, 
12, 13, 29, 31, 32 and 36. In more detail, Art 8 establishes the technical rules that 
shall be implemented for the connection to the system of LNG facilities and 
recognizes the role of the Agency (ACER), which may make recommendations 
towards achieving compatibility of technical rules, where appropriate. 
Furthermore, Art 12 provides for the designation of storage and LNG system 
operators whose tasks are established in Art 13, while Art 29 states that 
unbundling provisions on distribution system operators (Art 26) shall not prevent 
the operation of a combined transmission, LNG, storage and distribution system 
operator, provided that the operator complies with certain independency 
requirements. Combined operators are quite common in the EU, such as Enagás 
in Spain, Gasunie in The Netherlands, Fluxys in Belgium, National Grid in Great 
Britain, REN in Portugal, Snam in Italy, DESFA in Greece, TIGF in France and 
Energinet.dk in Denmark.   
 
 However, the most important articles affecting LNG operations are Art 31, 32 and 
36. Though the Gas Directive does not impose ownership unbundling on LNG 
operators, but only a lenient account unbundling according to Art 31, the majority 
of them are subject to ownership unbundling provisions. This ensures 
independency of LNG operators in Europe through measures that are not directly 
imposed on them, but it is a by-product of applying ownership unbundling rules 
to TSOs that own LNG terminals.  
 
 Art 32 maintains regulated TPA as a default regime to LNG terminals in Europe, 
which is based on published tariffs, applicable to all eligible customers. These 
tariffs have to be objective, non-discriminatory and transparent, so as to facilitate 
the entrance of new players in the market. They also have to reflect the actual 
costs incurred, ensuring in this way an appropriate return on investment and by 
extension the viability of the project. National regulatory authorities shall fix and 
approve the tariffs and methodologies underlying their calculation in advance of 
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their entry into force and their decisions have to be autonomous and directly 
binding. Member states under the third energy package may intervene regarding 
tariffs only through general policy guidelines, as it is stated in the European 
Commission’s Interpretative Note on regulatory authorities.95  
 
 
 3.2.2. THE EU TPA EXEMPTION PROCEDURE 
 
 Finally, despite the fact that the European Legislation offers the right of access to 
third parties, in order to enable a well-functioning internal energy market, it also 
grants the right for an exemption of this right, according to Art 36 of the Gas 
Directive (Art 22) The article maintains the five exemption criteria contained in 
the second Gas Directive and stipulates that exemptions can only be granted by 
regulatory authorities, and not by member states, as allowed under the second 
Directive. The exemption decision shall be further notified by the competent 
authority to the Commission, together with all the relevant information with 
respect to the decision. The Commission may request that the regulatory 
authority or the member state concerned amend or withdraw the decision to 
grant an exemption. 
 
 The role of this article is crucial because although the main purpose of third party 
access is to facilitate the entrance of new players in the market, there are and 
other important considerations to take into account, such as security of supply 
and the need for more investments in energy infrastructure. Because an open 
access regime may discourage investments and endanger security of supply, the 
European Legislator has introduced the TPA exemption mechanism to balance 
investment-competition trade-off.  
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 Specifically, Art 36 provides a potential exemption from the TPA requirement for 
new gas infrastructure projects or for significant increases of capacity in existing 
infrastructure for a defined period of time and is granted under the following 
conditions: 
   
a) the investment must enhance competition in gas supply and enhance security of 
supply;  
b) the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the investment would 
not take place unless an exemption was granted;  
c) the infrastructure must be owned by a natural or legal person which is separate 
at least in terms of its legal form from the system operators in whose systems that 
infrastructure will be built;  
d) charges are levied on users of that infrastructure;  
e) the exemption is not detrimental to competition or the effective functioning of 
the internal gas market, or the efficient functioning of the regulated system to 
which the infrastructure is connected.  
 
 
 Guidance for assessing these conditions is laid down in the Commission's 
“interpretation note96. This note stresses that “exemptions will (…) only be 
granted exceptionally and on a case-by-case basis”, so it is suggested that the 
exemption may only be approved after a meticulous examination by the 
competent authority97.  
 
 Lastly, a new element of the procedure is the emphasis made on Capacity 
Allocation Mechanisms (CAM) and Congestion Management Procedures (CMP) 
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under the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC. Before granting an exemption the relevant 
national regulatory authority shall decide upon the rules and mechanisms for 
management and allocation of capacity. These rules apply equally to exempted 
and non-exempted facilities. The details of this requirement are largely left for the 
more detailed Regulation 715/2009.  
  
 
 
3.3. ACCESS-EXEMPTION REGIME: FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN 
COMPETITION AND INVESTEMENTS 
  
 3.3.1. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING TPA 
 
 The liberalization of the gas market is becoming a substantial part of the 
downstream business, so discussions about whether liberalized markets can 
provide for the security of supply are emerging. The main concern is that whether 
TPA finally promotes or discourages competition and ultimately, benefits or 
undermines security of supply objectives. On the one hand, TPA promotes 
competition in an open market because the owner of the infrastructure is 
required to make capacity available to third party users, leading in theory to more 
widespread infrastructure usage and greater diversification of gas supply for 
downstream customers. Regarding LNG, third parties that import LNG through an 
existing terminal now may have access to more supplies on the spot market at 
cheaper prices, threatening in this way the incumbent's market share and 
revenues and at the same time eroding the traditional pricing system based on 
oil-indexation. 
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 3.3.2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
 
 On the other hand, there have been arguments saying that an open access 
regime discourages further investments and as a consequence harms security of 
supply. For example each component of the gas infrastructure is capital-intensive 
and therefore quite prohibitive without securing an acceptable return of the 
capital. In a liberalized market both the demand and price are uncertain and 
constant legislative changes which create legal uncertainty to the investors about 
the future regulation and the impact of these changes to future, undermine 
further investment stability in the long-run. Traditionally, this needed security is 
provided by long-term commitments which mitigate the level of risk involved in 
such investments. In this way, the owners of the infrastructure are protected 
from the opportunistic behaviour of third-party users, who either benefit from 
using the facility which is provided for them against payment of a regulated price 
or when the investment is not successful, they do not seek access and pay 
nothing for not using the facility. The investor in the latter case bears the risk 
solely98.  
 
 Generally, the EU does not consider long-term contracts to be anti-competitive 
by nature, but they are monitored by the Commission under competition law on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account duration issues, maturity of the market, 
investment incentives etc. Clearly, TPA services and short-term contracts are 
necessary for competition and development of the markets. However, it is equally 
obvious that long-term contracts are also needed to support investments and 
security of supply that the spot market alone is unlikely to achieve, given the long-
term nature of the natural gas business.99  
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 3.3.3. ISSUE OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES-COMPETITION TRADE OFF 
 
 Furthermore, as demand for energy increases both investments and upgrades in 
infrastructure are essential to satisfy this demand. However, as it is already 
mentioned the interests between creating competition and incentivizing 
investments may not always be aligned. Therefore, the European regulatory 
framework with the use of TPA exemption provisions tried to create a balance 
between luring investments and ensuring unimpaired competition.100 Since one of 
the main EU objectives is the creation of dynamic competition neither investment 
incentives nor market liquidity shall be compromised at the expense of the 
other.101 Competitive markets promise efficiency and liquidity and are necessary 
to maximize consumer welfare. For this reason, exemptions should be exceptional 
and limited to those investments whose realization is impossible under the 
regulated TPA regime.102  
 
 According to ERGEG guidelines103, TPA should be regarded as a default regime 
and exemptions shall only be granted when the investment is able to create new 
market entry possibilities. The report also follows a tough line on exemption 
requests by dominant market players and supports that this player must prove 
that his market position will be diluted as a result of this exemption and show 
how the investment will enhance the position of smaller market players. The 
same strict approach was maintained by the Commission in its draft staff working 
document in November 2008104, which mentions that exemptions have to clearly 
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meet the necessity and proportionality requirement. The Commission also 
stresses the need for promoters of such projects to perform a market test, in 
order to measure demand before obtaining an exemption and takes a stronger 
position on full and partial exemptions.105 However, although exemptions should 
in no way be granted light-heartedly in dominant firms, these undertakings 
usually have the means to finance such projects106 
 
 Generally, NRAs have followed a more lenient stance when approving 
exemptions. Regarding LNG terminals, today there are 3 exempted terminals in 
Great Britain, 1 in France, 1 in Netherlands and 1 in Italy (exemption for the FSRU 
OLT Offshore LNG Toscana was revoked). Admittedly, the projects are similar in a 
number of respects. All the facilities will enlarge total capacity in the market and 
ultimately improve security of supply and benefit the gas sector as a whole. 
Additionally, and the 4 NRAs accepted that the projects will strengthen 
competition at least in the long-run and improve the diversification of energy 
supply. However, it is intriguing that British, Dutch and French authorities applied 
the exemptions to the whole capacity of the terminals, whereas in Italy 
exemptions were granted in relation to 80% of the total capacity and the 
remaining 20% still remained subject to regulated TPA regime. This move seems 
to reflect the understanding that, even though new projects are of great 
importance, exemption requests should only be approved if and insofar as they 
are necessary.107   
 
 Ultimately, legislation needs to find the right balance between competition and 
infrastructure investments or in other words between open access regime and 
exemptions. Since the EU has adopted a long-term orientation in the 
development of its gas market, all markets parameters should be taken into 
account when trying to achieve its goals. Unfortunately, unclear regulation, 
complicated commercial arrangements and structural and behavioural drawbacks 
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in the gas market discourage real competition to emerge. Hence, necessary 
institutional framework should be established from the beginning in order to 
create a stable investment environment and certainty for new players seeking to 
enter the business. Liberalization does not need to impede new investments. On 
the contrary, with the proper regulation, guidance and structural reform the 
opposite could happen.  
 
 
3.4. ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE AND GAS MARKETS 
 
 3.4.1. DEFINITION  
 
 Efficient and transparent access to energy facilities is an essential precondition 
for any competition to emerge. This access can be required either through sector-
specific regulation, as it is already discussed or on the basis of EU competition law 
and in particular on the doctrine of essential facilities under Art 102 TFEU. In 
general, essential facilities are facilities or infrastructure which are essential for 
reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business, and 
which cannot be replicated by any reasonable means.108 In the gas sector this 
legal doctrine can be applied to natural gas pipelines and LNG regasification 
terminals.  
 
 3.4.2. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT 
 
 Within the EU, the evaluation and exercise of this right is based on 3 specific 
conditions developed by the ECJ in the landmark Bronner case.109 Firstly, the 
infrastructure must be controlled by a dominant player and its refusal of access to 
its facility could remove competition from the market. Then, the access must be 
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essential for the party requesting it-there is no alternative or substitute and the 
new user is economically unable to construct a similar facility to satisfy his needs. 
Lastly, the access must be denied without any objective reason. For example if 
access is technically or economically impossible and the undertaking refuses to 
grant it for this reason, the refusal would not be viewed as anticompetitive. In the 
EU the doctrine has been applied widely and especially after the Energy Sector 
Inquiry the application of Art 102 TFEU has been very strong in order for the EU to 
dilute natural monopolies and liberalize gas markets.  
 
 Competition law and particularly Art 102 TFEU and essential facilities doctrine 
have emerged as essential tools for the European Commission in its attempt to 
improve market conditions. As the sector-specific gas regulation has so far been 
unable to create a competitive market structure, the Commission is trying to use 
and other means such as competition law tools to achieve the same results. 
Competition enforcement and sector-specific regulation are actually 
complementary instruments and they can work together, so as to establish a 
truly-liberalized energy market and create capacity to compete.  
 
 
4. LNG IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ACCESS REGIME APPLIED TO 
LNG REGASIFICATION TERMINALS 
 
4.1. EU STRATEGY FOR LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 
 
 Europe is one of the main gas consumer regions in the world and currently 
natural gas represents around a quarter of the EU’s total primary energy 
consumption. As the EU commitments to create a sustainable and carbon-free 
energy future drive the European energy policy, gas will continue to play a vital 
role for its member states the next decades. Consequently, ensuring competitive 
gas prices for both EU companies and citizens is crucial, in order to keep 
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competitive advantages, since competition from rapidly growing economies 
around the globe becomes stronger. Unfortunately, the EU imports almost all its 
gas supplies, so its strong dependency on non-EU countries, especially Russia and 
Norway creates concerns regarding security of supply. With natural gas 
production in many European countries declining too, diversification of external 
supplies and the need for new investments in the gas infrastructure for the 
creation of a fully-integrated European gas market have become top priorities for 
the EU to accomplish.  
  
 
 4.1.1. GROWING IMPORTANCE OF LNG FOR THE EU 
 
 To solve these issues, the Union has started looking at LNG as a means for 
diversification and as an essential part of its future energy mix. EU wants to 
explore the full potential of LNG and take advantage of the current 'gas glut' and 
the availability of cheap LNG. These current market dynamics in combination with 
changes in the global LNG business (already analysed in the first chapter) indicate 
that LNG will play a key role in ensuring a reliable and competitive gas system in 
Europe. Moreover, the emergence of short-term spot markets will increase 
market liquidity and competition for spot LNG cargoes, while upgrading the role 
receiving terminals have in the LNG value chain. This increasing international 
competition over LNG cargoes has forced Europe to consider ways, in order to 
stand as a valuable outlet for LNG market participants seeking to capitalize on 
competitive regasification terminals and gain access to liquid wholesale gas 
markets. Currently, the LNG price differentials between Asia and Europe have 
pushed short-term and spot cargoes away from European countries to Asian 
markets, creating security of supply issues in the EU. This means that Europe has 
to compete with these countries for LNG supplies and granting favourable access 
conditions to LNG terminals constitutes an essential part of the energy game. 
With market liberalization in the EU, terminals were considered to be strategic 
elements of the downstream market and became subject to TPA requirements 
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supported by two functioning trading hubs- the British NBP (National Balancing 
Point) and the Dutch TTF (Title Transfer Facility). 
 
  
 4.1.2. CLOSER LOOK AT THE EUROPEAN LNG IMPORT TERMINALS  
 
 In Europe, there are 22 LNG facilities (onshore or FSRU) in ten different 
countries110 with total regasification capacity reaching 204 bcm/year in 2017111 
which is clearly sufficient, taking into account annual gas consumption of 400-500 
bcm/year in recent years.112 However, though the existing capacity is adequate 
with further additions planned113, the current import terminals are not evenly 
distributed across the EU and have low utilization rates due to higher Asian LNG 
prices and competition from pipeline gas. Specifically, the average usage of 
regasification terminals in Europe has decreased since 2010, from 53% to 25% in 
2013, and in 2014 just 19% of the total send out capacity was used.114 The busiest 
terminals in 2016 were those in France, Italy and Lithuania with annual 
throughput utilization rates above 30%.115 
 
 Nevertheless, this low utilization rate and generally the fact that global 
regasification capacity exceeds global liquefaction capacity does not necessary 
pose a problem. On the contrary, it provides flexibility and optionality to LNG 
market participants seeking to access different regions, so as to leverage short-
term market dynamics and arbitrage opportunities. It is obvious that the role of 
terminals has changed in order to adapt to the current competitive market 
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environment. This is the reason why at present, terminal operators started to 
provide new services such as ship reloading, transshipment, bunkering etc next to 
their core business, making the terminals more flexible and customer oriented.116  
 
 At this point, it should be mentioned that, since the present European LNG 
regasification capacity is more than adequate to satisfy the current demand, 
there is no reason for the EU to invest in constructing more terminals or 
expanding the capacity of the old ones. Instead, the Union should focus on 
improving the access conditions of the existing terminals which are currently 
under-utilized. However, it should be kept in mind that the available capacity is 
not optimally distributed across the EU and many member states, especially in 
South Eastern European regions still lack LNG regasification terminals. This in 
combination with the expected increase of gas demand and the global trend 
towards shorter-term contracts or even spot contracts make investments in gas 
infrastructure necessary, in order to provide market players with sufficient 
guarantees of access to LNG markets. National markets have to be well-
interconnected and EU has to ensure that the appropriate infrastructure is in 
place for each member state. The Union shall consider all these factors when 
deciding how to achieve a fully-integrated internal gas market where gas flows 
without any disruption among EU member states. 
 
 
4.2. ACCESS TO EU REGASIFICATION CAPACITY - REGULATED VERSUS EXEMPTED 
TERMINALS 
  
 In Europe, access to LNG terminals is granted via two regimes that co-exist in the 
same country or even at the same terminal. They can be subject to either 
regulated third party access or can be exempted from TPA requirement. 
Currently, 16 of the 22 existing LNG terminals are regulated, 5 are exempted117 
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and 1 has hybrid TPA arrangements.118 While regulated terminals provide access 
to third parties based on fair, transparent and non-discriminatory conditions, at 
exempted terminals access is negotiated directly between the owner of the 
terminal and the shippers/customers and tariffs resulting from these commercial 
negotiations do not have to be published. In the latter case, third parties are able 
to get access to such terminals only via secondary markets, since capacity at 
exempted terminals is normally sold under a long-term contractual basis.119  
 
 Requests for exemptions are approved by regulatory authorities, in order to 
encourage investments and are only granted for a limited period of time (20-25 
years). Moreover, terminals that are subject to regulated TPA regime cannot be 
exempted afterwards but the opposite can happen. For example FSRU OLT 
Offshore LNG Toscana in Italy which requested and was granted an exemption 
from regulated TPA, in 2012 asked to revoke it due to low utilization.120 In 2017, 
the terminals exempted from regulated TPA regime covered 53 mtpa or 36% of 
regasification capacity, which means that a large part of regasification capacity in 
the EU is contracted on a long-term basis.  
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FIGURE 4: CONTRACTED VS. AVAILABLE CAPACITY 2017
121
 
 
 
 
4.3. PRACTICAL CONCIDERATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TPA TO 
TERMINALS 
 
 Article 17 of the Reguation (EC) No 715/2009 determines the principles of 
capacity-allocation mechanisms and congestion-management procedures 
concerning storage and LNG facilities and obliges terminal users not to hoard 
capacities they do not use. In more detail, capacity at the European terminals can 
be obtained via primary or secondary markets and LNG contracts shall include 
measures to prevent capacity-hoarding, especially in cases of contractual 
congestion. The terms and conditions applied to terminals are different 
depending on the specialities each terminal has, the market structure that 
operates and of course its regulatory regime (if it is regulated or exempted from 
TPA).  
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 4.3.1. PRIMARY CAPACITY  
  
 The EU legislation does not stipulate a specific process for allocating 
regasification capacity to potential users. It only requires operators to make the 
maximum capacity available to market participants and choose mechanisms that 
are transparent and non discriminatory. The UK regulator (Ofgem), considered 
auctions to be the most effective and transparent means of allocating capacity, 
since it can meet all the regulatory requirements stipulated by the third energy 
package.122 Another capacity allocation mechanism is an open season procedure 
often applied to exempted terminals. Moreover, free annual and monthly 
capacities might be booked according to the 'first come - first serve' principle.123 
 
 
 4.3.2. SECONDARY MARKETS - ANTI-HOARDING MEASURES   
 
 If the primary capacity holder does not need the contacted capacity, then this 
capacity has to be made available to third parties on the secondary market, either 
by direct agreement or by holding auctions. However, terminal owners or primary 
capacity users may prefer not to release their spare capacity to make a profit but 
to hold it, in order to protect their market share through blocking the entry of 
new players. For this reason, the imposition of anti-hoarding measures such as 
the UIOLI mechanism (use it or lose it) that ensure the efficient utilization of the 
infrastructure are considered crucial and quite useful, especially for facilities with 
multiple users. Such measures may penalise a user who hoards capacity or oblige 
such a user to offer capacity back to the market.124 An anti-hoarding mechanism 
can be implemented in parallel with a regulated TPA regime or as a stand-alone 
measure. Most of the exempted terminals in the EU, except for South Hook 
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terminal in the United Kingdom were granted an exemption from TPA 
requirements, on the condition that they implemented UIOLI measures.125 At 
exempted terminals almost all their capacity is contracted on a long-term basis, 
so available capacity is almost non-existent (Figure 4). This fact may lead to 
market foreclosure, if complementary measures are not taken. By adding 
additional conditions to exempted terminals, the regulatory authorities tried to 
create a more competitive market environment, where new players are able to 
gain access to unused capacity, utilization of the infrastructure is efficient and 
primary capacity holders are incentivised to use their capacity to the fullest extent 
possible. 
 
 
 4.3.3. TRANSPARENCY  
 
 Transparency is an essential requirement for a well-functioning TPA regime. In 
order for players to exploit the current LNG market developments, detailed 
information in relation to tariffs, avaliable capacity and commercial and 
operational services is necessary.126 Although transparency is not lacking at 
regulated terminals most of the time, access rules and tariffs for exempted 
terminals are often not published127. LNG and storage system operators are 
required to make public only the amount of gas in each storage or LNG facility and 
the available storage and LNG facility capacities128 since this information is crucial 
for market participants in order to assess whether they wish to bid for capacity.129 
However, the available capacity often becomes public by the terminal operator at 
relatively short notice for example one or two weeks in advance. This short period 
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makes it unattractive and even impossible for a shipper to make logistic 
arrangements and bring cargoes to terminals130 and of course leverage short-term 
commercial opportunities. 
  
 TPA to regasification terminals is an essential part of the wider reform taken 
place in the gas markets in the EU. Generally, TPA increases competition and 
contributes to market liberalization. However, practical measures taken to 
implement TPA and the powers current regulators have, in order to enforce it 
while monitoring the market, are of crucial importance too. A well-established 
TPA regime can be the driving force behind the development of the European 
LNG market and a valuable asset for market participants seeking to exploit the 
new market dynamics.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Market environment surrounding LNG has experienced drastic changes which  
are pushing towards more flexibility and liquidity. Key factors for this 
reconfiguration of the LNG business is the looming oversupply, the growing 
number of players seeking to play a bigger role in the global LNG trade and the 
emergence of spot markets and trading hubs for LNG. Moreover, rigid long-term 
contracts which have long dominated the LNG trade have started to decrease, 
since they can no longer reflect the current competitive LNG market structure. 
Buyers are no longer willing to accept inflexible terms in their contracts and  LNG 
liquefaction operators as well as suppliers who are in need of finding sales 
markets for their surplus LNG volumes, are looking for ways to exploit the new 
market dynamics and short-term trading opportunities. LNG trade is shifting to a 
buyers' market, where importers are shaping the future of the deals with 
exporters. However, this restructuring of the LNG trade will remain incomplete, if 
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access to the last part of the LNG value chain - regasification terminals is 
hampered.  
 
 Under these new circumstances, Europe wants to stand as a valuable outlet for 
global LNG players who are looking for ways to get access to liquid wholesale gas 
markets. The EU's prosperity, security and resilience is ultimately based upon 
stable and abundant supply of energy. As Europe's domestic production is 
declining  and its dependence on gas imports is increasing, energy security issues 
arise, so diversification of supply sources and routes has become a key objective 
for the EU to accomplish. All these factors in combination with the policy adopted 
by the EU to stimulate liberalization, in order to create a competitive internal gas 
markets, are likely to create new opportunities for LNG in Europe.  
 
 Until now, Europe has introduced three consecutive energy packages designed to 
establish a well-functioning gas market and create a stable regulatory 
environment which can ultimately ensure efficiency, energy security, low prices 
and stimulate investments. The third Gas Directive 2009/73/EC introduced further 
measures requiring member states to provide open access to gas infrastructure, 
specifically pipelines and LNG terminals on fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory terms. 
 
 LNG import terminals under the current EU legislation are considered as essential 
infrastructure and part of the downstream market just like pipelines. Therefore, 
regulated TPA has been implemented to those facilities. Third party access is the 
cornerstone for successful liberalization and an important means of access to gas 
markets. Nevertheless, TPA may discourage incentives for new investments, since 
energy industry is capital-intensive and certainty regarding demand and price 
secured by long-term commitments is essential from the investors' perspective. 
Consequently, an exemption mechanism was introduced to foster investments in 
new infrastructure and balance investment-competition trade-off.  
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 Currently, 16 of the 22 terminals in EU are subject to regulated TPA provisions, 5 
are fully exempted and 1 was granted partial exemption. Their regasification 
capacity is also sufficient to satisfy the current needs but are not fully used. 
Capacity can be obtained via primary and secondary markets and anti-hoarding 
mechanisms shall be included in contracts, in order to ensure efficient utilization 
of the infrastructure and prevent bottlenecking and congestion. At exempted 
terminals capacity is sold under long-term arrangements, so effective secondary 
markets is a requisite, so as to allow other third parties to access the terminals. 
Moreover, though transparency is not an issue for regulated terminals, since they 
have to ensure a level playing field for third party users, exempted terminals are 
subject to low transparency requirements. EU Regulation requires exempted 
terminals only to publish information in relation to available capacity but 
sometimes these data are published on short notice making it hard for potential 
users to organize their portfolio.  
 
 Exemptions are generally beneficial to incentivise investments, but the 
asymmetric situation of regulated and exempted terminals in the EU in relation to 
access services, tariffs, transparency requirements, available and contracted 
capacity etc, may put some terminals in a more advantageous position than 
others. Therefore, the EU has to find the right balance between access and 
exemptions as well as balance between short-term and long term ambitions. This 
could be achieved through optimal and thorough energy regulation, utilization of 
competition policy that will provide trust and certainty for all market players in 
the gas supply chain, more effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
and by creating more functioning secondary markets which will enable more 
players to enter the wholesale business. Regarding the exemption procedure the 
evaluation should be done in a more coordinated and coherent way and more 
guidance should be provided by the competent authorities, since the provisions 
and the criteria are not always clear and many times are susceptible to various 
interpretations.  
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 Summing up, the EU's current energy policy aims to make Europe a viable and 
commercial market for global LNG. Europe is well-positioned to absorb additional 
volumes of LNG, since it has available infrastructure, surplus capacity to offer to 
third parties and a number of liquid trading hubs for gas. If LNG prices remain 
competitive, Europe can also take on the role as the LNG market of last resort. 
Facilitating access conditions to LNG terminals is an important prerequisite for 
this to happen. This could be achieved by imposing total TPA, partial TPA, by 
creating functioning secondary markets or by providing access to under-utilized 
capacity via effective regulation.  
 
 However, a variety of regulatory, structural, operational and behavioural 
drawbacks as well as complex infrastructural and commercial arrangements 
impede the development of a liquid and competitive wholesale gas market. Only 
if these present barriers are overcome, Europe will be likely to achieve a fully 
liberalized gas market and hence become an important player in the global 
energy balance of powers.            
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